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Video Game Regulation and the Courts
By LINDA SUE DOBB*
I
Introduction
Video games are currently the most popular mass-market
entertainment in America.' It is estimated that five billion dol-
lars was spent in 1981 alone by video game enthusiasts playing
"Pac-Man," "Space Invaders" and "Missile Command. '2 Al-
though the games are popular with some adults,3 the biggest
audience for these arcade amusements is teenagers between
the ages of twelve and seventeen.' Counterbalancing the teen
passion for video has been community concern; video mania
has been blamed for everything from truancy and moral cor-
ruption to myopia and misspent lunch money.5
In some locales the upshot of this anxiety has been the use
of newly drafted or recently revived anti-gambling, curfew and
licensing ordinances to restrict video play.6 For the most part,
these ordinances are designed to confine the number of games
in' and the location of 8 arcades, but a few ban adolescent video
* Member, Third Year Class. A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1973;
M.L.S., Simmons College, 1974.
1. Bernstein, Atari and the Video-Game Explosion, FORTUNE, July 27, 1981, at 40;
Latham, Video Games Star War, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1981, at 100 (Magazine); Owen,
Invasion of the Asteroids, ESQUIRE, Feb. 1981, at 58; Games That Play People, TIME, Jan.
18, 1982, at 50.
2. See Games That Play People, supra note 1 at 51.
3. See Owen, supra note 1, at 58.
4. Latham, supra note 1, at 51; Ziegler, Regulating Videogames: Mixed Results in
the Courts, 34 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4 (1982).
5. Games That Play People, supra note 1, at 53; Scott, Parents Voice Concern Over
Video Game Centers, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 12, 1982, at 22.
6. For example:
In Irvington, a New York City suburb on the banks of the Hudson, the village
trustees recently debated a resolution that would prohibit the playing of coin-
operated video games by anyone under 17. Parents complained that their chil-
dren were cutting school and squandering their lunch money.
Bernstein, supra note 1, at 40.
7. See, e.g., America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F.
Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (interrelated licensing and zoning ordinances limiting
number of devices permitted).
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play altogether.' Because community restrictions on video
games threaten huge potential profits, 10 coin machine vendors,
arcade operators and other commercial interests have
mounted several legal challenges to video game regulation.
This note first reviews the constitutional issues raised by
video game regulations. It then discusses the recent court de-
cisions concerning anti-gambling, curfew and licensing ordi-
nances directed at video games. It contrasts the current
challenges to video game regulations with past challenges to
pinball, pool hall and bowling alley ordinances. Because these
former hangouts of American youth are directly analogous to
the modern video arcade, pinball, pool hall and bowling alley
cases provide an historical framework within which to monitor
the trend and probable direction of community video game reg-
ulation.' The final section of this note predicts the form and
substance of effective video game regulations in the future. It
suggests that carefully drawn and administered licensing stat-
utes will satisfy the concerns of communities, withstand the
challenges of commercial interests and endure the scrutiny of
courts.
II
Constitutional Issues Raised by Video Game
Regulations
Certain fundamental issues appear in virtually every opinion
which evaluates community anti-gambling, curfew or licensing
statutes. As recurring themes, these issues fall loosely into
three categories. The first concerns police power: does the
8. See, e.g., Malden Amusement Company v. City of Malden, No. 82-1840-S, slip
op. (D. Mass. 1983) (amusement center's license denied to video game operator).
9. See, e.g., Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 66 Ill. App. 3d 542,
23 Ill. Dec. 289, 383 N.E.2d 1316 (1978) (licensing ordinance forbidding proprietor from
permitting minors to use multiple play machines).
10. "Industry surveys indicate that there are estimated to be altogether between
3000 and 5000 operators, who operate possibly as many as 1,000,000 amusement games
and jukeboxes in about 300,000 establishments ... ." Brief of Amusement and Music
Operators Ass'n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee, City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
11. See generally Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 815 (1963) (coin-operated pinball machines or
similar devices, played for amusement only or confining reward to privilege of free
replays, as prohibited or permitted by antigambling laws); Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 252
(1980) (Zoning or Licensing Regulation Prohibiting or Restricting Location of Billiard
Rooms and Bowling Alleys). Indeed, many video games are located in pool halls, bow-
ling alleys and former pinball arcades.
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community have the power to enact restrictive legislation?
The second concern is vagueness and overbreadth: does the
proposed regulation contain phrases incapable of precise un-
derstanding or administration? The final concern is the protec-
tion of first amendment issues: does the regulation have the
effect of inhibiting a basic right or a certain class of persons
deserving of special protection?
A. Video Games and the Exercise of Police Power
A community's authority to regulate or prohibit video games
stems from the exercise of local police power.12 A community
is typically, "empowered to enact such bylaws and ordinances
as may be necessary and proper to preserve the health, quiet
and good order of the town which includes, among other
things, the power to restrain and prohibit [unwanted
activities] ."3
Gambling, curfew and licensing ordinances restricting the lo-
cation or play of video games may be a valid exercise of com-
munity police power. However, the ordinances must meet a
two-prong test; they must "tend in some degree to prevent of-
fenses or preserve the public health, morals, safety or general
welfare," and "the means chosen must be reasonably neces-
sary for the accomplishment of the intended purpose and not
unduly oppressive." 4
Courts generally assume community ordinances are valid.'
5
One seeking to rebut this presumption must show that the
adopted ordinance has the motive or effect of being "arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable" and that it "will not promote the
12. See generally 16 AM. Jum. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 259-264 (1964).
13. City of Barlett v. Hoover, 571 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tenn. 1978) (discussing general
validity of local ordinances while invalidating pinball prohibition conflicting with state
statute).
14. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 383 N.E.2d at 1319 (1978)
(upholding various pinball restrictions); see generally City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. at 303 (1982) ("Rational Basis" appendix to the opinion of Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Silver, 98 Cal. App. 3d 745, 159 Cal. Rptr. 762
(1979) (upholding ordinance forbidding establishment of an arcade: "In enacting zon-
ing ordinances, the municipality performs a legislative function, and every intendment
is in favor of the validity of such ordinances." Id. at 749); see also Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) ("If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning
purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.").
For use of community zoning ordinances in control of video games see generally Zie-
gler, Regulating Videogames: Mixed Results in the Courts, 34 LAND USE L & ZONING
DIG. 4 (1982).
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safety or general welfare of the people."' 6 Courts justify im-
posing this heavy burden by maintaining that it is not the job
of the judiciary to "concern [itself] with the wisdom of legisla-
tion nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the Legislature."' 7
Because the power of local governments to enact restrictive
legislation is almost universally accepted by the judiciary,
commercial interests must attack the means through which
communities exercise that power and the substantive effect of
prohibitive legislation in order to overturn it.
B. The Means-Phrasing of Video Game Ordinances-Vagueness
and Overbreadth
Ordinances directed at video games may be challenged be-
cause they are drafted in language that is either too indefinite
to be understood or too sweeping to be judiciously applied. An
ordinance is void for vagueness "if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined" or if it does not give a person of ordinary intel-
ligence reason to know what is prohibited.' 8 Such an ordi-
nance violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, which requires that citizens be given notice of
punishable conduct and that law enforcement be based on a
standard more precise than individual official discretion. 9
Yet, even if a statute is sufficiently exact to withstand a chal-
lenge of vagueness it may still be invalid on the basis of over-
breadth.2" An overbroad statute is one which "sweeps within
its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and
Fourteenth amendments";21 that is, a statute which, though not
directed at constitutionally protected activities, may have the
effect of burdening speech or association.
To mount a serious challenge based on overbreadth it is nec-
essary to show both that a limitation on speech or association
is an important part of the law's objective, and that there is no
16. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 383 N.E.2d at 1319 (1978);see
generally City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
17. WNEK Vending & Amusements Co. v. City of Buffalo, 107 Misc. 2d 353, 434
N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (nevertheless court undertook an extended
analysis of community anti-gambling ordinances as applied to video games); see also
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).
18. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
19. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
20. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONsTrrurIONAL LAw 722
(1978).
21. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); accord NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
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way the law can be retooled to serve only constitutionally per-
missible ends.2 2 In the field of video game regulation, a chal-
lenge based on overbreadth is difficult to maintain in the
courts. It must be premised on the assumption that video
game regulation is aimed at expression protected by the first
amendment 23 or that it is aimed at association worthy of con-
stitutional safeguarding. 24 These and other issues concerning
the essential rights which may be impinged upon by video
game regulation are discussed in the next subsection of this
note.
C. Constitutionally Protected Rights-Speech, Association and
Property
1. Speech
The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech .... *25 Courts have
given wide latitude toward the type of social, political and ar-
tistic expression deserving of constitutional protection as
"speech." By protecting most modes of expression, the courts
hope to protect the free flow of ideas and information in our
society.26
It is arguable whether video games can be construed as a
form of expression worthy of the first amendment's protection.
True, the games have been recognized as entertainment27 and
as copyrightable subject matter2 8 but the significant elements
22. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrUIONAL LAw § 12-24, at 711 (1978).
23. For cases in which this approach is discussed see Malden Amusement Com-
pany v. City of Malden, No. 82-1804-S, slip op. (D. Mass. 1983); Playtime Games, Inc. v.
City of New York, 535 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); America's Best Family Showplace
Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Caswell v. Licensing Com-
mission for Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 444 N.E.2d 922 (1983).
24. For cases discussing this approach see Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mes-
quite, 630 F.2d 1029, reh'g en banc denied, 634 F.2d (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd in part and
remanded, 455 U.S. 283, 102 S. Ct. 1070, 71 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1982); Caswell v. Licensing
Commission for Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 444 N.E.2d 922 (1983).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. The most famous expressions of this idea are found in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting) and,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., con-
curring). For a more recent expression of this idea see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 564 (1975).
27. WNEK Vending & Amusements Co. v. City of Buffalo, 434 N.Y.S.2d 608, 617
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
28. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 669
F.2d 852 (2nd Cir. 1982) (audiovisual display of video game given copyright protection).
No. 31
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of communicating an idea or providing information seem to be
lacking. As one court wrote in denying a preliminary injunc-
tion against an ordinance directed at video games:
In no sense can it be said that video games are meant to
inform. Rather, a video game, like a pinball game, a game of
chess, or a game of baseball, is pure entertainment with no in-
formational element. That some of these games "talk" to the
participant, play music, or have written instructions does not
provide the missing element of "information." . . . [A] lthough
video game programs may be copyrighted, they "contain so lit-
tle in the way of particularized form of expression" that video
games cannot be fairly characterized as a form of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment.29
2. Association
Although the first amendment also provides for the "right of
•.people peaceably to assemble, 3 ° most courts have not at-
tempted to define the right of assembly or association in-
dependent of other first amendment rights.3 1 Thus, while
assembly is clearly a protected right within the context of
political organizations,3 2 religious groups 33 or concerted advo-
cacy of some kind,34 it is not necessarily a free-floating individ-
ual right. For instance, the Supreme Court has never extended
the stringent protection given political, religious or legal affilia-
tion to social association not connected to other first amend-
ment activity.35 A few lower courts have protected such social
association by rigorously scrutinizing any law burdening
friendly intercourse or public mobility.36 In general, however,
curfews and laws restricting social activity may, if sufficiently
29. America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170,
174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Other courts that have considered the issue have been in agree-
ment, see supra cases cited at note 23. But see Oltmann v. Palos Hills, No. 82 CH 3568,
slip op. at 13-14 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 1982); Gameways, Inc. v. McGuire, N.Y.L.J., May 27,
1982, at 6, col. 2 (N.Y. May 3, 1982) (as cited in Caswell v. Licensing Commission for
Brockton, 444 N.E.2d at 926 (1983).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31. L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUrIONAL LAW § 12-23, at 700-702 (1978).
32. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 24-25 (1976) (per curiam).
33. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
34. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958).
35. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1041 (1980); accord
Sunset Amusements Co. v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. 3d 64, 74-75, 101
Cal. Rptr. 768, 773-74, 496 P.2d 840, 845-846 (1972).
36. See Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1041-42 (1980); Saw-
yer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 315-16 (5th Cir. 1980).
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justified by state interest and drawn with requisite precision,37
be affirmed as a valid exercise of police power without the
strict scrutiny traditionally accorded laws abridging first
amendment freedoms.
The gathering of teens and others in video arcades can most
comfortably be categorized as social association. 8 Ordinances
prohibiting video play and the establishment of arcades or lim-
iting the hours of arcade access will probably withstand any
challenge premised solely on a charge that they inhibit the
"freedom of association." Unless these ordinances are defec-
tively drawn31 or impinge on other specially protected rights
and/or groups,' they will retain their presumptive validity.
3. Property
The constitutional provision that no person shall "be de-
prived of ... property without due process of law"'" has not
been an extended subject of controversy in video game regula-
tion. For the most part, the granting or denial of video game
licenses is usually preceded by notice and an administrative
hearing.' This respect for due process insures that licensing
statutes, which merely limit or tailor the presence of video
games to a community's needs, do not infringe on the constitu-
tional rights of those with a protectible interest in property.43
Curfews and age-based ordinances do pose a threat to the
commercial value of video arcades and games as property." It
37. See generally Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1264-65
(M.D. Pa.), affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (scrutiniz-
ing validity of curfew ordinance directed at youths); Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. village of
North Riverside, 383 N.E.2d 1316, 1322 (1978).
38. Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d at 927 (1983).
39. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 60-67.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
42. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Town of Nantucket, 545 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1982); L-Jo
Amusements, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 81 Civ. 7823 (E.D.N.Y. March 1, 1982);
America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 444
N.E.2d 922 (1983); 1001 Plays v. Mayor of Boston, 387 Mass. 879, 444 N.E.2d 931 (1983);
Gardiner v. LoGrande 83 A.D.2d 614, 441 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
43. O'Neill v. Town of Nantucket, 545 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1982) (discussing an
application for licensing). For a discussion of what constitutes a protectible property
interest deserving of due process see generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972); Medina v. Rudman, 545 F.2d 244, 250 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891
(1977). An approved license application may ripen into a protectible property interest,
see Gardiner v. LoGrande, 83 A.D.2d 614, 441 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
44. See supra text accompanying note 4. Any regulatory statute aimed at video
No. 31
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is presumed, however, that on balance, such ordinances serve
the public health, welfare, safety and morals in a manner
which far outweighs the incidental commercial loss they may
cause private interests. 5
Only anti-gambling statutes, capable of making the posses-
sion of video games a criminal activity,' could cause a true for-
feiture of property. 7 In recent court decisions, however, such
statutes have seldom been deemed the appropriate regulatory
device for video games. For the most part, the modern attitude
toward electronic games characterizing them as games of skill,
rather than as gambling games of chance,48 removes the ma-
chines from the sphere of confiscable property. This
recharacterization affords video game owners a claim for pro-
tection of property within the fourteenth amendment's guaran-
tees of both due process and equal protection.
D. Equal Protection Under the Law
The Equal Protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
has been liberally described as requiring that lawmakers treat
"like things in a like manner."49 But under the broad powers
granted local governments by state constitutions, 50 communi-
ties may discriminate in their application of the law if there is a
legitimate basis grounded in the public interest for doing so. 5 1
games which prohibits those under 17 from arcade egress, or any curfew which limits
the hours minors may be abroad, cuts into a substantial share of the commercial mar-
ket for video devices.
45. See Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 383 N.E.2d 1316, 1322
(1978); Rothner v. City of Des Plaines, No. 81-C2669, slip. op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1981).
46. See, e.g., ordinance discussed in WNEK Vending & Amusements Co v. City of
Buffalo, 96 Misc. 2d 983, 410 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), rev'd, 434 N.Y.S.2d 608
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); and ordinance discussed and considered inappropriate for video
game regulation in State v. Bloss, 62 Hawaii 147, 613 P.2d 254 (1980).
47. See, e.g., application of anti-gambling statute to pinball machines causing
seizure and destruction of devices in State v. Pinball Machines, 404 P.2d 923 (Alaska
1965) (arguably these were ordinary pinball machines but because found capable of
being manipulated for wagering they were confiscable property). Where pinball ma-
chines or other electronic devices have been used to provide customers with purely
chance-dependent amusement they have also been deemed confiscable, see, e.g., Mer-
andette v. City & County of San Francisco, 88 Cal. App. 3d 105, 151 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1979).
The Merandette opinion was affirmed by Gaming Device Defined, 65 Op. Cal. Att'y
Gen. No. 2 (Feb. 1982).
48. See State v. Bloss, 62 Hawaii 147, 613 P.2d 354, 360 (1980); see also infra text
accompanying notes 114-115.
49. City of Ferndale v. Palazzolo, 62 Mich. App. 140, 233 N.W.2d 216, (1975).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
51. See State v. Bloss, 62 Hawaii 147, 613 P.2d 354, 358 (1980) 'rhe Equal Protecti6n
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The charge of unfair discrimination and a denial of equal
protection has been made by commercial interests in commu-
nities where electronic games have been classified as gambling
devices. 52  A community may have legitimate reasons for
prohibiting coin-amusements capable of use for wagering;"
but video games, it has been argued, do not share enough in
common with such devices to be reasonably so classified or
regulated.' Additionally, the claim to equal protection can be
made on the basis that a community which allows other legiti-
mate games of skill such as bowling or billiards cannot arrive
at any legitimate reason for discriminating against video
games.5 Some courts have respected these claims to equal
protection for video games; 56 others recognize a valid public in-
terest in limiting coin-amusements as outweighing the need for
an evenhanded approach. 7
E. The Rights of Youth
The last major constitutional issue present in video game
regulation concerns the rights of minors to the same broad
guarantees of freedom given adults under the constitution.
Generally, courts subscribe to the maxim that "the constitu-
tional rights of adults and juveniles are not co-extensive."58 It
is thus a valid exercise of the police power to regulate the ac-
tivities of minors in a way which might not be permissible were
it extended to adult behavior.5 9
Similarly, the special protections given certain groups of in-
Clause does not prohibit the State from passing laws which treat different classes...
differently, but only from treating classes differently when the basis of discrimination
does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate statutory objective."
52. See infra text accompanying notes 80-115 (discussing the equal protection ar-
guments in the Cossack, Palazzolo and WNEK opinions).
53. The traditional reasons are cited in Cossack v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d
726, 736-737, 523 P.2d 260, 267, 114 Cal. Rptr. 460, 467 (1974) (Burke, J., dissenting)
(quoted, in part, in text accompanying note 85).
54. WNEK Vending & Amusements Co v. City of Buffalo, 434 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
55. Analogous argument made to bring pinballs within claim for equal protection
in Cossack v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d at 734-35 (1974).
56. See, e.g., WNEK Vending & Amusements Co. v. City of Buffalo, 434 N.Y.S.2d
608, 617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); State v. Bloss, 613 P.2d 354, 358-360 (Hawaii 1980).
57. See, e.g., Malden Amusement Company v. City of Malden, No. 82-1840-S, slip
op. (D. Mass. 1983); America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F.
Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
58. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
59. McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (D.N.H. 1981), rev'd, 668
F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982).
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dividuals under the law have not been accorded to minors as a
group.6 ° Statutes abridging the rights of juveniles to move
freely at night 6' or to act independently in private matters
62
have not been given the strict scrutiny which would be af-
forded to such statutes were they directed at minorities63 or
aliens." No "compelling state interest"6 must be shown for
age-based ordinances;66 if challenged, such ordinances must
only bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest in the
health, welfare and safety of the community.67
Thus, ordinances which prohibit minors from the playing of
video games,68 deny them access to arcades 69 or generally re-
strict their hours of recreational freedom70 may, without much
difficulty, retain their presumptive validity under the police
power. Such laws have only been the subject of strict scrutiny
in the Fifth Circuit.7' The trend toward constitutional criticism
of age-based ordinances may, however, spread to other areas of
the country if the frequency or intensity of their use
60. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1265 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (analyzing Utah statute requiring
physician to notify parents of unemancipated minor's forthcoming abortion only in
terms of its reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest).
63. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (strict scrutiny accorded state
miscegenation law).
64. For an example of a law aimed at aliens receiving strict scrutiny see Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); but see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), in which
a law concerning alien teachers refusing to seek naturalization was subject only to a
rational basis test (i.e., the law must bear a rational relation to the public interest to be
valid).
65. This is the traditional statement of the strict scrutiny test. See generally Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 645, 646 (1975) (digesting the rules of San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (as to when strict scrutiny is appropriate
method of review).
66. See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072-73 (5th Cir. 1981) (recog-
nizing that strict scrutiny test need not be applied and urging that the standard of the
plurality of Bellotti v. Baird (see infra text accompanying notes 133-134) be adopted;
McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D.N.H. 1981).
67. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, at 1255 (M.D.
Pa. 1975).
68. See, e.g., Rothner v. City of Des Plaines, No. 81-C2669, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11,
1981); Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 383 N.E.2d 1316 (Ill. 1978).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
71. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981); Aladdin's
Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit also
accords strict scrutiny to laws abridging freedom of association as an independent first
amendment guarantee, see Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 315-16 (5th Cir. 1980).
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increases. 72
The interplay of these constitutional issues in the recent reg-
ulation of video games and in the earlier regulation of pinball
machines, bowling alleys and pool halls through anti-gambling,
curfew and licensing statutes is the subject of the following
sections of this note.
III
Anti-Gambling Ordinances
The current use of anti-gambling ordinances to prohibit
video games is similar to the use once made of anti-gambling
ordinances to prohibit pinball machines. Pinballs machines
are the modern amusement device most directly analogous to
video games. Both are coin-operated devices, both provide free
replays for "high score ... attained," and both are ostensibly
designed only for amusement. 3
Many early decisions held that coin-operated pinball ma-
chines, though offering no remuneration and though not in-
tended to promote betting, could be prohibited by anti-
gambling ordinances. 74 In most instances, the anti-gambling
statutes were interpreted as measures to remedy social and
moral problems and were broadly construed to prohibit pinball
machines as games of chance which promoted social and moral
decay.
People v. Gargiulo" illustrates such an attitude. In Gargi-
ulo, the New York Court of Appeals found that even pinball
machines used only for amusement could be the object of anti-
gambling prohibitions. Justifying this rather harsh conclusion,
the court wrote that the anti-gambling ordinances directed at
pinball supported a valid moral purpose:
It is quite true that these devices may be used for amusement
purposes, but it is a well-known fact that... they often draw
to the stores where operated an element of unsavory reputa-
tion. It is also an alarming thing to note that these games fre-
quently invite young children who can ill-afford to squander
72. A similarly demanding analysis was made of a curfew ordinance by the district
court in New Hampshire in McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046 (1981),
however, the opinion was reversed by the First Circuit the following year.
73. See generally Annot., 89 A.LR.2d 815 (1963).
74. See, e.g., cases gathered by state in annotation at 135 A.LR. 104 (1941); 89
A.L.R.2d 815 (1963); King, The Rise and Decline of Coin-Machine Gambling, 55 J. CRim.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc. 199 (1964).
75. People v. Gargiulo, 164 Misc. 39, 298 N.Y.S. 951 (N.Y. Magis, Ct. 1937).
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the money their parents allow them for their lunches and other
expenses. The records of the police department and the Chil-
dren's Court indicate that in some cases children addicted to
this form of gambling are driven to petty thievery in order to
obtain the nickels necessary to play these games. It is ex-
tremely important that the activities of children be diverted
from these gambling devices if they are to be kept away from
paths leading to crime. If a strict enforcement of this statute
does nothing else than keep young children from becoming
gamblers in the future, the best "interests" of society will be
served.7 6
The same moral outrage that youthful "addiction" to pinball
provoked in the New York Court of Appeals in 1937 was shared
by a large number of American jurisdictions from 1920 and
1960. 77 Gradually, however, the attitude toward pinball play
changed. Significantly responsible for this change in attitude
was the change in pinball games themselves. Over the years
pinball machines progressed from games of pure chance, simi-
lar to coin-operated slot machines, to games in which a player's
skill at using flippers and other technological enhancements
accounted for the prize of free replays. The games thus took
on some of the characteristics of other legitimate sporting con-
tests such as bowling. 8 With skill as a large factor in the high
scores achieved, anti-gambling ordinances designed to prohibit
games of chance no longer seemed the appropriate regulatory
device for pinball.79 Cossack v. City of Los Angeles8 ° is repre-
sentative of the modern attitude toward pinball. In Cossack,
the Supreme Court of California invalidated a Los Angeles Mu-
nicipal Code provision on the ground that it violated article XI,
76. 298 N.Y.S. at 954.
77. See Annot., 89 A.LR.2d 815, 847-852 (1963).
78. See King, supra note 73, at 202.
79. See City of Ferndale v. Palazzolo, 233 N.W.2d 216 (Mich. 1975); State v. Bloss,
613 P.2d 354 (Hawaii 1980); Cossack v. City of Los Angeles, 523 P.2d 260 (Cal. 1974).
There have been two notable exceptions to this general proposition: State v. Pinball
Machines, 404 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1965) (in which the court's analysis of pinball machines
and gambling devices found a critical similarity between them in the offerings of prize,
chance and price; and thus, pinball machines were validly prohibited in Anchorage
and Fairbanks); and, Total Vending Services, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 157 Ga. App. 28,
276 S.E.2d 89 (1981) (local ordinance outlawing the possession of pinball games not
repealed by State of Georgia's general statute exempting amusement devices from
criminal gambling statute).
80. Cossack v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 726, 523 P.2d 260, 114 Cal. Rptr. 460
(1974). Plaintiffs in this case were an operator of coin-amusement games, an owner of
a bowling center and the Assistant Dean of the UCLA School of Law, 11 Cal. 3d at 728
n.1.
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section 7 of the California Constitution.8' The ordinance pro-
hibited the maintenance of all "pin games" in public places.82
It made no distinction between those devices which could be
characterized as games of chance and those in which skill was
the dominating factor. The court held that for the ordinance to
be valid, a distinction should be made. Contrivances which re-
sembled gambling or slot machines because of their reliance
on pure chance should be regulated in separate ordinances
from those devices, equipped with flippers, which permitted a
player to manipulate a ball and to use skill to achieve a "pay-
off' of additional plays. As the ordinance in question made no
such distinction, the court found that it arbitrarily discrimi-
nated against legitimate games of skill.83 The court reasoned
that the law was no longer serving the purpose for which it was
intended. It was being used to prohibit modern, flipper-style
pinball machines while its purpose was only to limit the
number of chance-dependent devices in commercial
establishments.84
In his dissent to Cossack, Judge Burke revived a moral argu-
ment similar to that used to buttress Gargiulo and many ear-
lier anti-pinball decisions. Judge Burke stated that:
[P]inball and other coin-operated games of this nature "fre-
quently are gambling devices or readily converted into such by
a mere mechanical adjustment or by their use for wagering"
.... These games are particularly tempting to children and
reasonably may be viewed as a notorious waste of both time
and money, encouraging loitering, gambling and other unpro-
ductive habits .... Finally, unlike ... sports activities ...
pinball games involve essentially no physical activity
whatever, and cannot be justified as promoting either physical
fitness or good sportsmanship.85
Burke's dissent concluded that the City of Los Angeles could
legitimately limit the number of "unproductive" and poten-
81. Article XI, section 7, of the California Constitution reads: "A county or city
may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances
and regulations not in conflict with general laws." In 1950, the legislature of the state of
California adopted extensive legislation with respect to gambling machines or devices.
Cal. Penal Code section 330b, subdivision 4 expressly excluded pinball from its list of
enumerated gambling devices. 11 Cal. 3d at 731 n.4.
82. 11 Cal. 3d at 731.
83. Id. at 735.
84. Id. at 732-34.
85. Id. at 736 (Burke, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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tially immoral devices within its business establishments. 6
In City of Ferndale v. Palazzolo,87 a 1975 pinball case, the
constitutional issues raised by the use of anti-gambling statues
to prohibit pinball machines were again clearly set forth. In
Palazzolo, the Michigan Court of Appeals examined a 34-year
old City of Ferndale ordinance 88 prohibiting the maintenance
of "any game of skill or chance or partly of skill and partly of
chance, used or capable of being used for gaming."89 The 1931
ordinance was being used in 1975 to prevent commercial estab-
lishments from keeping pinball machines. The court came to
the conclusion that the language of the ordinance was anti-
quated and its current use unjustified, noting that: [t]he lan-
guage of the ordinance has remained the same, while the
condition of the world, or at least the condition of pinball ma-
chines, has changed."'  The court contrasted the average pin-
ball machine of the 1940's, commonly a game of pure chance,
often rigged to be used as a gambling device, with modern pin-
ball machines of the 1970's stating that:
Modern pinball machines involve skill to a much greater extent
because of the addition of "flippers". . . Attaining a high
score in the old-style flipper-less game depended almost com-
pletely on chance. A modern pinball machine, however, armed
with one or more pairs of flippers, allows for a much greater
variance in scores, depending on the player's skill in manipu-
lating the flippers.91
The Michigan court also found the ordinance in question
vague and ambiguous. Its phrasing allowed Ferndale to outlaw
all gaming and pinball machines regardless of type.92 While
the ordinary businessman might assume that modern, flipper
variety machines were games of skill, the ordinance did not
86. The majority, however, took a less passionate stand in declaring the Los Ange-
les statute void.
87. City of Ferndale v. Palazzolo, 62 Mich. App. 140, 233 N.W.2d 216 (1975).
88. Section 2 of FERNDALE, ILLiois, ORDINANCE 200 read as follows:
No person, his agent or employee, shall for hire, gain or reward, keep or main-
tain in a place of business in the City of Ferndale a gaming room or a gaming
table or any game of skill or chance, or partly of skill and partly of chance,
used or capable of being used for gaming .... Games such as 'box-ball' or
'pin-ball' machines, so-called, are hereby declared to come under the prohibi-
tion herein contained.
233 N.W.2d at 217-218.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 218.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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distinguish such pinball machines from others. The court con-
cluded that the ordinance did not meet the "due process stan-
dards required" of a local statute, stating that:
In light of the changes which have taken place in the last 30
years in the field of coin-operated amusement machines, we
must conclude that the ordinance is vague and ambiguous be-
cause it does not inform the citizen with reasonable precision
what acts it intends to prohibit.
93
In addition, the Palazzolo court declared invalid clauses of
the Ferndale ordinance which attempted to prohibit pinball by
merely creating artificial distinctions between automated
amusements and semi-manual forms of entertainment such as
billiards and bowling. 4 The court found that the guarantee of
equal protection under the Constitution mandated that
"lawmakers must treat like things in a like manner. 9 5 In the
court's view critical examination of the permitted game of bow-
ling established its distinct commonality with the prohibited
game of pinball.96 Both were games of skill and had as their
reward "free throws of the ball,"9 similarities that led the
court to conclude that "exempting one of them from the prohi-
bition of the ordinance, while including the other, [was] a vio-
lation of equal protection of the laws." 98
Although few would quarrel with the ultimate determination
by the Palazzolo court that Ferndale's anti-gambling ordinance
could not be used to prohibit pinball machines, the court's pin-
ball/bowling analogy seems somewhat tenuous. Pinball has
never really been considered a sport. It is not a physical activ-
ity in the same sense as bowling. One does not win an "extra
roll" of a pinball, just a free ball. The game of bowling is lim-
ited, usually, to twenty-two rolls as an essential part of its scor-
ing, whereas one may continue to play the same pinball game
almost indefinitely. Still, the court's emphasis on the impor-
tance of a player's skill and its recognition of changing social
attitudes toward pinball play make the Palazzolo opinion seem
a reasonable evaluation of an outmoded ordinance.
Most modern jurisdictions have similarly overruled the use
of anti-gambling ordinances as devices to control pinball
93. 233 N.W.2d at 219; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
94. 233 N.W.2d at 220.
95. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
96. 233 N.W.2d at 220.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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play.99 However, recent concerns, very much like those ex-
pressed in the Gargiulo opinion, about misspent lunch money,
the undesirable atmosphere of arcades and youthful addiction
to amusement, 00 have prompted some communities to revive
anti-gambling ordinances in a new war on video games.
WNEK Vending & Amusements Co. v. City of Buffalo 0 1 is an
opinion reviewing the recent attempt by the City of Buffalo to
deny video game licenses under an anti-gambling ordinance.
In declaring the use of such ordinances invalid, the New York
court used an analysis similar to that of the pinball cases, Cos-
sack 02 and Palazzolo ,103 but added its own complete examina-
tion of the video game phenomenon'°4
The WNEK court based its determination that an anti-gam-
bling statute was an inappropriate regulatory device for video
games on three contentions. First, that video games could not
be considered gambling devices because skill rather than
chance "predominates in the operations of the machine."'105
Second, that police abused their power to regulate when their
standard of review was outmoded and inflexible. 10 6 And, third,
that attempted law enforcement which is neither even-handed
nor rationally connected to a legitimate community purpose
should be discontinued. 0 7
To support its first contention, the WNEK court made an
elaborate inquiry into the nature of video games. 0 8 It noted
99. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 815 (Supp. 1982).
100. See Games That Play People, supra note 1, at 51-53.
101. WNEK Vending & Amusements Co. v. City of Buffalo, 107 Misc. 2d 353, 434
N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
102. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., material at 107 Misc. 2d at 356, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
The SPACE INVADERS model which Petitioners seek to license is represen-
tative of ... video games .... The SPACE INVADERS are actually projec-
tiles which move vertically at uniform speeds from top to bottom of the video
screen which is immediately in front of the player. The INVADERS can shoot
back at the player and when such shots occur, a sound is emitted and the shot
is visible on the video screen.
105. 434 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
106. Id. at 615.
107. Id. at 616-617.
108. Id. at 612-13. Explaining how it managed to derive so intimate an acquaintance
with the nature of video games the court wrote:
The Court realized that it could not fully understand the exact nature and op-
eration of the video games from the testimony of the witnesses. Counsel re-
quested that the Court view the machines at the warehouse of one of the
Petitioners. The Court refused and suggested that Petitioners bring the ma-
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the amount and sophistication of the video gadgetry which
physically distinguished the games from devices of mere
chance. It recognized that this physical complexity also made
it almost impossible for proprietors to alter the nature of the
games to serve illegal ends. °9 Finally, it observed that the
electronic intricacy of video games demanded a high degree of
player skill and imput-important factors removing the games
from the category of chance-dependent gambling devices. The
court stated that games like "Space Invaders":
depend upon eye-hand coordination, reflexes, muscular control
and above all, concentration. Proper timing in aiming and
firing is essential. The eyes and hands of an operator are in
constant motion. The player must continually adapt to instan-
taneous changes in the position of his laser base relative to the
location of the invader projectiles. The amount of physical skill
and energ, required to successfully play a video game is
enormous.
The combination of all these factors led the WNEK court to
categorize video games as non-gambling devices, and thus
outside the ambit of the Buffalo ordinance.
Additionally, the court found that the City of Buffalo was en-
gaging in an "arbitrary and capricious" exercise of administra-
tive discretion"' by prohibiting video games without being
fully acquainted with the nature of video play. The court
stated that if the City had bothered to investigate the use of
video games it would have found that video play was remarka-
bly similar to other coin-amusement activity already permit-
ted."2 The devices in question were directly analogous to
chines into Court. The operation of four video games . . . and one bowling
game ... was described and demonstrated by both an experienced player and
a novice.
434 N.Y.S.2d at 611. The opening paragraphs of the opinion lead the reader to believe
that, perhaps, the novice demonstrator was the author of the opinion, Judge Green.
109. '"The number of laser bases in a game can be changed by the manufacturer by
adjusting a dipswitch in the logic board but all the logic boards in SPACE INVADERS
have been set for three laser bases and cannot be changed once they are distributed."
434 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
110. Id. at 612-13.
111. Id. at 615. Indeed, one of Buffalo's commissioners responsible for licensing
amusements testified that he had never operated any video games and did not know
how they worked.
112. Judge Green went through a seven point analysis of both the electronic bow-
ling devices already permitted and video games. He found a substantial matching in
both their physical characteristics and in the skill demanded to play: "I find that the
similarity between the operation and extended play features of coin-operated video
games and bowling games is substantial .... Id. at 613.
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mechanical bowling devices which had previously been classi-
fied as games of aptitude and coordination by the Buffalo City
Council.' 13
Most importantly, the WNEK court felt that the use of an
anti-gambling ordinance to prohibit video games denied the
Buffalo community an entertainment resource that was widely
recognized as acceptable elsewhere." 4 The court took a broad
view of the importance of video games in noting that they were
not backroom amusements, but omnipresent, reputably spon-
sored and extravagantly popular games. "Thus, the contempo-
rary context in which video games are manufactured,
distributed and operated bears little resemblance to the Buf-
falo atmosphere in 1952 [the effective date of Buffalo's anti-
gambling, anti-coin device ordinance] .""' The New York court
found that strong practical, administrative and social reasons
all militated against the use of anti-gambling ordinances to reg-
ulate video games.
Although not every modern jurisdiction can be expected to
give the same enthusiastic support to video games, it seems
unlikely that many will use anti-gambling ordinances to regu-
late them. The nature of the activity,"6 the critical case law in
pinball regulation, and the respectable attention video games
113. The Buffalo City Council operated under an extremely broad ordinance defin-
ing gambling devices:
A machine, slot machine, apparatus, paraphernalia or device whether manu-
ally, mechanically, electrically or otherwise operated, in or upon which a game
or contest involving an element of chance may be played ... upon and as the
result of, the insertion of a piece of money or coin, or other object for which a
fee, charge, or other consideration is imposed directly or indirectly.
CrrY OF BUFFALO, N.Y., ORDINANCE, ch. VIII, § 27(1) (a), 434 N.Y.S.2d at 612. Thus, it
was up to the individual knowledge and familiarity of each council person to deter-
mine whether or not a device should be classed as a gambling device or a legal
amusement.
114. Today, coinloperated video games are distributed to shopping malls, movie
theatres, bowling alleys, roller rinks, pizzerias, and neighborhood grocery
stores. Video games, originally introduced in Japan several years ago and
mass-marketed in this country for the last eighteen months, have recently
been adapted for use on television screens for home entertainment. A recent
SPACE INVADERS competition in New York City, sponsored by a reputable
manufacturer and distributor of video games, attracted over 4,000 entrants and
awarded as the grand prize, not surprisingly, a $2,000 ASTEROIDS table top
video game.
434 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
115. Id.
116. As described in WNEK and Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. at
638-39.
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have received in the media and elsewhere" 7 are persuasive
factors indicating that anti-gambling ordinances will not be the
appropriate regulatory device for video games.
IV
Age-Based Ordinances
A second means of regulating amusement centers and video
arcades is age-based and curfew ordinances. These ordinances
prohibit youths from certain activities or public places or con-
fine youths to certain hours of recreational freedom."' The re-
strictions these ordinances impose upon teenagers may
impinge upon constitutionally protected rights and have been
a fertile source of controversy between commercial interests
and communities. Among the arguments proferred by the for-
mer are: a) denying teenagers access to video games unfairly
limits. their first amendment right of expression by obstructing
access to entertainment;" 9 b) denying access to a video arcade
abridges teenagers' first amendment right of association by de-
priving them a place to meet with others;120 and c) legislating
the amount of time that may be spent in seeking diversion
outside the home sets an inflexible community standard which
interferes with personal family decision making and
discipline. 121
The Fifth Circuit in Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mes-
quite 1 22 grapples with some of the constitutional issues raised
117. See generally Bernstein, supra note 1, at 40; Goode, When Video Games Can
Help Out, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 15, 1982, at 16, col. 1; San Francisco Chron., Apr. 5,
1982, at 2, col. 5. Indeed, the City of San Jose has installed video games in its superior
court to amuse those who must wait. But the exact opposite has happened in the Phil-
ippines where all video games were ordered to be destroyed. Eastbay Today, Nov. 20,
1981, at 1, col. 1.
118. See, e.g., ordinances discussed in Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065
(5th Cir. 1981) (curfew ordinance); Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d
1029 (5th Cir. 1980) (minors restricted in use of arcades); Rothner v. City of Des
Plaines, No. 81-C2669, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1981) (confining video games to li-
censed liquor establishments); McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.H.
1981) (curfew ordinance); Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 383
N.E.2d 1316 (fll. 1978) (minors restricted in use of arcades).
119. See supra note 23.
120. See supra note 24.
121. This is an argument which appears in Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d at
1074 (5th Cir. 1981); Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d at 1043 (5th Cir.
1980); McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. at 1052 (D.N.H. 1981).
122. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir.), reh'g en bane
denied, 634 F.2d (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd in part and remanded, 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
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by an age-based ordinance restricting video game play. The
City of Mesquite ordinance stated:
It shall be unlawful for any owner, operator or displayer of coin
operated amusement machines to allow any person under the
age of seventeen (17) years to play or operate a coin operated
amusement machine unless such minor is accompanied by a
parent or legal guardian. 123
The purpose of the ordinance was to halt truancy and prevent
children from contact with adults "who promote [d] gambling,
sale of narcotics and other unlawful activities.' 1 24
The court in evaluating the validity of this ordinance first
asked if it seemed likely to prevent truancy in the most appro-
priate manner. To this they answered no, stating that: "Bar-
ring young people from all coin-operated amusement devices
at times and on days when school is closed simply bears no
relation whatever to the city's alleged interest in eliminating
truancy.' 12  Additionally, the court reasoned that: "Before
such centers existed, children found places and opportunities
for truancy, and they would find places were such centers to
become extinct."'126
Next, the court looked at the ordinance's avowed purpose of
protecting children from exposure to corrupting influences.
Here, evidence presented by Mesquite in the district court 127
failed to persuade the court of appeals that the adults likely to
expose youngsters to gambling and narcotics had a distinct
tendency to frequent video arcades. The court came to a con-
clusion that persons interested in corrupting youth would be
drawn to the amusement centers not by the machines, but
rather by the children.128 The statute served no real purpose
as a deterrent if such persons were just as likely to follow chil-
dren elsewhere, "the schoolyard, the nearby street corner, the
movies, the local fastfood establishment, the parking lot, the
concert, the park, or the beach.' 1 29
Contrasting the avowed purpose of the ordinance with the
123. CrrY OF MESQUITE TEXAS ORDINANCE No. 1103, § 3, quoted in Aladdin's Castle,
Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d at 1033 n.2 (1980).
124. 630 F.2d at 1039.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1040.
127. '"The district court recognized, as we do, that the city presented no evidence
that such people ever come to these centers." 630 F.2d at 1040.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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type of operation run by Aladdin's Castle, the court of appeals
seemed almost predisposed to rule in favor of the commercial
enterprise. The court's statement of facts begins with the fol-
lowing glowing assessment:
Aladdin's Castle, Inc. owns and manages approximately one
hundred family amusement centers throughout the United
States, including three centers in Texas. Typically located in
suburban shopping areas, each Aladdin's center contains a va-
riety of coin-operated amusement devices. Adults run and su-
pervise the patrons' use of these centers. Their duties include
the enforcement of Aladdin's rules prohibiting loitering, gam-
bling, smoking, and the consumption of food, non-alcoholic
drinks and alcoholic beverages on the premises. These rules
exist in all such centers operated by Aladdin's. Aladdin's Cas-
tle also enforces a rule that bars school children from the es-
tablishment during school hours.'3 0
Part of the court's displeasure with the Mesquite ordinance
seems motivated by its conviction that Aladdin's Castle en-
gaged in decent, self-regulating behavior as a proprietor of
arcades.
The court's overwhelming concern in evaluating the ordi-
nance, however, was not in the propriety of applying it to Alad-
din's Castle but in the suitability of using it to control young
people. The Fifth Circuit perceived the age-based ordinance as
an unfair burden on youth's right, guaranteed by the first and
fourteenth amendments, of free association.13 1 It thus under-
took an extended examination of the evolving doctrines of pro-
tection for social association and minors' rights to equal
protection under the law.13 2
In its discussion of the latter, the court scrutinized the Mes-
quite ordinance in light of Justice Powell's opinion in Bellotti v.
Baird.33 In Bellotti, the United States Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Massachusetts law which required, in every
instance, a minor to seek adult-either parental or judicial-
approval before obtaining an abortion. In his judgment for the
Court, Justice Powell set forth a test describing three valid rea-
sons why a state might be empowered to restrain and protect
minors in a manner "which would be unconstitutional if ap-
plied to adults." Justice Powell designated "[t]he particular
130. Id. at 1032.
131. Id. at 1041-42; see also supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 30-40 and 58-72 and accompanying text.
133. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical deci-
sions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of
the parental role in child rearing,"'' 4 as important considera-
tions to use in evaluating the validity of legislation directed at
youth.
In applying the Bellotti three point test to the amusement
centers ordinance, the Aladdin's Castle court found that the
restraint on Mesquite's children was not justified. The ordi-
nance did not really protect children from an established vice,
nor did it aid them in an essential moral dilemma. The court
observed: "that they can be barred from making the 'critical
decision' of whether or not to deposit a quarter in a coin-oper-
ated amusement device is not a proposition that deserves seri-
ous consideration. 135 In the eyes of the court, the ordinance
was an unworthy substitute for parental judgment: it was bur-
densome for parents who might wish to send their children to
an arcade for amusement and bothersome to parents in their
role as arbiters of family discipline. 36
The appellate opinion ended with a strong plea for liberty
and freedom from "governmental regimentation encompassing
virtually every facet of a citizen's life.' 37 The court held that
the Mesquite age-based ordinance neither served the purpose
of protecting children nor preserved their constitutional rights.
The law was therefore declared "constitutionally offensive,"
and in violation of the constitutional guarantees of "liberty and
personal autonomy.""a
In its review of this appellate decision, 139 the United States
Supreme Court refused to consider the constitutional issues
revolving around the age-based limitation on video play. In-
stead the Court confined its consideration to the licensing
clause prohibiting video game operators from having "connec-
tions with criminal elements."'11 Justice Stewart, writing for
the Supreme Court, gave two reasons why the age-based ordi-
nance was not receiving review. First, the Texas Constitution
contained language which made its guarantees of equal protec-
134. Id. .at 634.
135. 630 F.2d at 1043.
136. Id. at 1044.
137. Id. at 1046.
138. Id.
139. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
140. For a discussion of this aspect of the case see infra notes 185-191 and accompa-
nying text.
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tion broader than those of the federal Constitution,14 1 and
"[a]s a number of recent Supreme. Court decisions demon-
strate, a state court is entirely free to read its own'constitution
more broadly than this court reads the federal Constitution, or
to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor of a
direct analysis of its corresponding constitutional guaran-
tee."" Justice Stewart also noted that it was the policy of the
Court to avoid unnecessary adjudication of federal constitu-
tional questions whenever reasonably possible. He stated:
"No reason for hasty decision of the constitutional question
presented by this case has been advanced. If Texas law pro-
vides independent support for the Court of Appeals' judgment,
there is no need for decision of the federal issue.' 43
Justice Powell,' 44 concurring in part and dissenting in part,
wrote that it was time the Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of age-based ordinances which may abridge
youth's right to free speech and association under the first
amendment. 145 There are several reasons, however, why a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court did not choose City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin's Castle, Inc. as a definitional case. Although the age-
based ordinance at issue was capable of discouraging teenag-
ers from assemblage and association, freedom of association
has typically been extended only to those gatherings devoted
to the advancement of beliefs and ideas."46 While there is no
doubt that when minors seventeen and under congregate to
play video games they are, indeed, assembled in one amuse-
ment center, few cases support the notion that the constitu-
tional freedom of assembly or association "extends to a
congregation of persons engaged in mere physical activity or
self amusement."' 47
Furthermore, the argument that the playing of video games
is entertainment or amusement worthy of free speech protec-
tion under the first amendment has its weaknesses.'4 Free
141. 455 U.S. at 293.
142. Id. at 294-295.
143. Id.
144. 455 U.S. at 297.
145. Id. at 298.
146. See Sunset Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. 3d
64, 74 (1969); see also infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text; accord Caswell v. Li-
censing Commission for Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 444 N.E.2d 922 (1983).
147. Sunset Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. 3d 64, at
74 (1969) (discussing freedom of teenagers to associate in roller rink).
148. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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speech protections typically concern the exchange of ideas;149
it is doubtful that the playing of video games encourages the
flow of ideas or would logically come within the protections of
the first amendment. 150 The elements of other protected com-
munications, such as movies,' 5 ' dancing'5 2 and political
speech 5 3 are missing here.
The unresolved constitutional issues presented by age-based
limitations on youth activities will probably not prevent com-
munities from seeking to regulate video games through cur-
fews and other age-based prohibitions. It is likely, however, as
long as video games remain attractive to teenagers and profita-
ble to commercial interests, and until the Supreme Court
makes a final determination regarding the first amendment
protections that should be afforded minors or games, that age-
based ordinances will continually put communities in conflict
with youths, commercial entrepeneurs and parents.
V
Licensing Statutes
We've got trouble my friends,
I say trouble,
With a capital T,
And that rhymes with P,
And that stands for pool.'5 4
With that lyric Meredith Willson's fast talking "Music Man"
jauntily exploited the fears of an earlier America, when par-
ents, town councilmen and the police disapproved of the habit
of young men meeting in pool halls for a bit of snooker, a peek
at the latest naughty magazine, and perhaps a smoke. Today's
parents are similarly dismayed that teens gather, spend money
and expend leisure time in video arcades.
Concern for the moral and social values of youth has been
reflected in several community licensing statues which restrict
the number, location of and supervision of youth amusement
centers. Because licensing statutes are flexible enough to be
149. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556-558 (1975).
150. America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
151. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
152. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
153. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
154. M. WILLSON, THE Music MAN (1957).
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tailored to a variety of community policing needs 5 1 they have
always been a popular regulatory device.
In the early part of this century, licensing statutes prohibit-
ing pool halls from occupying certain sections of a community
were often upheld as a valid exercise of local police power.156
Unless the ordinances were clearly unreasonable or over-
broad, the courts respected the judgment of local governments
in restricting pool room operations. Many courts acknowl-
edged that "public pool parlours [could] be the situs of gam-
bling, lotter[ies] or ... the purveying or use of drugs."'5 7 Thus
licensing statutes regulating pool room use, location or owner-
ship were almost automatically presumed to be valid social
and moral tools.
For example, in Murphy v. California,i58 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a community ordinance limiting the lo-
cation of pool tables to licensed hotels. The Court rejected evi-
dence that the independent parlour in question was lawfully
run and free from anything which could affect the morality of
the community or its patrons. 5 9 The Supreme Court stated
that such testimony was irrelevant. The Court reasoned that
the very act of keeping a billiard table had a harmful tendency,
and community authorities could take legislative notice of "the
idleness and other evils which result from the maintenance of
a resort where it is the business of one to stimulate others to
play beyond what is proper for legitimate recreation."' 6
In the years following Murphy, the social attitude toward
pool and billiards changed. Several courts invalidated local li-
censing statutes limiting pool room operations. 61 These courts
looked past the moral arguments against pool playing and con-
centrated on the maintenance of a pool room as a valid occupa-
155. See, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (restrict-
ing the persons who may operate amusement centers); Rothner v. City of Des Plaines,
No. 81-C2669, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1981) (restricting the location of video games);
Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 383 N.E.2d 1316 (1978) (restricting
number of machines and adolescent play).
156. See generally Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 257-58 (1980).
157. Tillberg v. Township of Kearney, 103 N.J. Super. 324, 247 A.2d 161, 164 (1968).
158. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912).
159. Id. at 628.
160. Id. at 629.
161. See, e.g., City of Meadville v. Caselman, 240 Mo. App. 1220, 227 S.W.2d 77 (1950);
O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949); Taylor v. City of Tal-
lahasse, 13 Fla. 418, 177 So. 719 (1937).
No. 31
COMM/ENT L. I.
tion in and of itself.'62 The courts began to apply an equal
protection theory, reasoning that
the operation of a pool hall was neither inherently bad nor det-
rimental to the morals of the community [and] that a munici-
pality's power to grant, refuse, or revoke licenses to carry on a
lawful business was subject to an implied condition that such
[a] determination [was] not... made arbitrarily or in contra-
vention of statutory and constitutional provisions requiring all
applicants be treated alike.'6
Community concerns that a pool hall would bring crime and
other social ills to an area were not considered adequate
grounds for denying an otherwise legitimate business a license
to operate.
The recent case of Roy v. Augusta,'64 epitomizes the modern
attitude toward pool hall operations. In Roy, the Supreme
Court of Maine scrutinized a local law regulating amusement
centers which stated that a "license shall be granted only if the
location is in such a place that it will not disturb the peace and
quiet of a family . ,,,"" Relying on this ordinance, city offi-
cials refused to reissue a billiards license to Roy because
youths liked to gather in large numbers on the streets outside
his pool room. The youths outside the hall often did create dis-
turbances to families in the area, but there was no evidence
that anything going on inside the pool room was disruptive. 166
In regranting an amusement center license to Roy, the Maine
court traced the history of billard regulation to a time in the
19th century when the playing of pool was considered morally
wrong. 67 But, the moral climate of Maine had changed in the
last one hundred years and the Maine Supreme Court
observed:
[B]owling and playing billiards [now] weigh much differently
162. 100 A.L.R.3d 252, 258-60 (1980).
163. Id.; see also supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
164. Roy v. City of Augusta, 387 A.2d 237 (Me. 1978).
165. Part of the AUGUSTA, MAINE, CITY ORDINANCE § 3-7 (1957):
Bowling alleys, shooting galleries, pool, billiard rooms-license required
prerequisites.
a) No person shall operate a bowling alley, shooting gallery, pool or billiard
room without obtaining a license from the municipal officers.
b) Such license shall be granted only if the location is in such a place that it
will not disturb the peace and quiet of a family, and such license shall be
renewed on or before the first day of May annually.
Quoted in 387 A.2d at 238.
166. Id. at 240.
167. Id. at 238-39.
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in our scale of values; they are acceptable, and indeed respect-
able, as beneficial recreational pursuits. Thus regarded, these
activities have no greater likelihood of being accompanied by
incidents arising on a public sidewalk, or street, outside the
confines within which the activity is conducted than various
other activities of recreation, or amusement, for which there is
no regulation by licensing as specially directed to avoiding dis-
turbance to family peace and quiet.
68
Under the court's restrained interpretation, a license could be
denied to Roy only if he allowed pool to be played in a disrup-
tive or illegal fashion. Events occurring outside the hall, how-
ever, were not the subject of the licensing ordinance and were
not under the proprietor's control. The ordinance in question
was valid, the court concluded, only in so far as it attempted to
regulate the activity of billiards within a billiard room. To hold
otherwise would make the law a broad mandate requiring the
proprietor be responsible for activities occurring outside the
concerns of the occupation for which he is obtaining a
license. 169
Recently, many communities have attempted to enact licens-
ing statutes that limit the number of video game devices in an
area, 17 proscribe the type of businesses which may house
video devices, 171 or describe the character of person who may
operate a video arcade.172  These licensing ordinances have
met with some degree of success in the courts and seem to be
the most flexible and easily enforceable means of community
regulation.
For example, Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North River-
side 173 represents a successful tailoring of a licensing statute
to meet the needs of a community. In Aladdin's Castle, the
operator of an amusement center sought to overcome the pre-
sumptive validity of a local ordinance that limited the number
of coin-operated devices permitted within designated areas.
168. Id. at 239.
169. Id. at 239-40.
170. See, e.g., America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F.
Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Playtime Games, Inc. v. City of New York, 535 F. Supp. 1069
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Gardiner v. LoGrande, 83 A.D.2d 614, 441 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981); 1001 Plays v. Mayor of Boston, 387 Mass. 879, 444 N.E.2d 931 (1983).
171. See, e.g., Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 444
N.E.2d 922 (1983); Rothner v. City of Des Plaines, No. 81-C2669, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept.
11, 1981).
172. See, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
173. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 383 N.E.2d 1316 (Il. 1978).
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The ordinance called for the owners of coin-operated amuse-
ment equipment to purchase a license for each machine owned
and to at no time maintain more than ten licensed machines in
any one area.'74 Aladdin's Castle fought the statute claiming
that North Riverside had no authority to adopt such a restric-
tion and that the limitation unfairly curtailed property
rights.
175
The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled against Aladdin's Castle
on both points. The court held that the Village was empowered
to regulate coin-operated amusements on any of several broad
grounds recognized under Illinois state statutes. 176 The stated
objectives of the North Riverside ordinance-the reduction of
juvenile truancy and the protection of a community against
crime-were valid purposes for local police action under the
Illinois state constitution.
77
Additionally, the court found that the "valid exercise of po-
lice power supersedes" private property rights "once an ordi-
nance is found reasonably related to the public health, safety,
or general welfare . . . [if] the means chosen are not unduly
oppressive.' 1 78 The Village produced extensive testimony that
the ordinance was intended to reduce the incidence of juvenile
crime and that in so doing the general welfare would be served.
The means chosen were not excessive: the ordinance limited
only the number of video games, not the devices per se. 7 9 The
court thus concluded that it had no grounds on which to deny
the presumptive validity of the local licensing ordinance.
Influenced by the Illinois Court of Appeals decision in Alad-
din's Castle, a federal district court in Rothner v. City of Des
Plaines8 ° upheld an even more restrictive local ordinance
174. VILLAGE OF NORTH RIVERSIDE, ILLINOIS, ORDINANCE No. 75-0-16:
No license shall be issued to any person or for any premises in excess of one
(1) license for every 500 square feet or gross floor area for each premise in
which said machine or device is located, provided however that no more than
ten (10) licenses shall be issued to any applicant or for any premises ....
383 N.E.2d 1317.
175. Id. at 1318; see also supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
176. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-42-2, 11-42-5 (1977) state: 'The corporate authorities
of each municipality may license, tax, regulate, or prohibit pinball or bowling alleys,
billiard, bagatelle, pigeon-hole, pool, or any other tables or implements kept for a simi-
lar purpose in any place of public resort." 383 N.E.2d at 1318.
177. Id. at 1322.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1320.
180. Rothner v. City of Des Plaines, No. 81-C2669, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1981).
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which allowed electronic games only in establishments li-
censed to serve liquor.18' Because Des Plaines, like North Riv-
erside, was authorized under the Illinois constitution to create
statutes to regulate for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals and welfare and to "license, tax, regulate or pro-
hibit pinball, or bowling alleys, billiard, bagatelle, pigeonhole,
pool, or any other tables or implements kept for a similar pur-
pose in any place of public resort,' 18 2 the court found that
Rothner could validly be prohibited from leasing electronic
games to grocery stores and other businesses.
The Rothner court was unwilling, as many other courts have
likewise been unwilling, to tamper with the judgment of the
legislature when it could infer that a statute had a valid pur-
pose for its adoption. Looking squarely at the limiting scope of
the Des Plaines licensing ordinance, the court reasoned that
confining the games to establishments selling liquor would
keep those too young to purchase liquor away from the ma-
chines. 183 Protecting minors from coin-operated amusements
was considered a constitutionally permissible aim in Illinois
where the broad mandate provided communities the power to
regulate for any purpose connected with the public welfare. 84
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. 8 ' provides the
most recent amusement center licensing case of major impor-
tance. The main thrust of the Supreme Court's opinion in Mes-
quite reviewed that part of a local ordinance which directed
the chief of police to deny a license to any applicant known to
have "connections with criminal elements."'86 Aladdin's Cas-
tle, a subsidiary of Bally Manufacturing and a nationwide oper-
ator of arcades had successfully challenged the ordinance in
state 87 and federal 88 courts as a vague mandate contravening
181. Id.
182. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-2 (1977).
183. No. 81-C2669 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1981).
184. Id.
185. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
186. MESQUITE, TEXAs ORDINANCE No. 1103, § 2.
Any person desiring to obtain a license for a coin-operated amusement estab-
lishment shall apply to the City Secretary .... The Chief of Police shall
make his recommendation based upon his investigation of the applicant's
character and conduct as a law abiding person and shall consider past opera-
tions, if any, convictions of felonies and crimes involving moral turpitude and
connections with criminal elements, taking into consideration the attraction
by such establishments of those of tender years.
Quoted in Aladdin's Castle v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1034 n.6 (1980).
187. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 559 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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both the Texas and federal constitutions.
The Mesquite ordinance was challenged on the grounds that
the phrase "connections with criminal elements" violated due
process. At issue was whether the ordinance failed to "give in-
dividuals fair notice of the conduct proscribed; 1 89 and whether
or not the phrase "connections with criminal elements" was
too vague a standard on which to deny an application for an
amusement center's license.
The United States Supreme Court found that the phrase
"connections with criminal elements" did not violate due pro-
cess. It was not intended to proscribe the behavior of the de-
fendant Aladdin's Castle; but rather, it was a directive to the
chief of police to further investigate the application of any po-
tential licensee known to have "connections with criminal ele-
ments." The Court held that a directive intended to define the
conduct of officials rather than citizens could be general in na-
ture, stating:
The applicant's possible connection with criminal elements is
merely a subject that the ordinance directs the Chief of Police
to investigate before he makes a recommendation to the City
Manager either to grant or to deny a pending application. The
Federal Constitution does not preclude a city from giving
vague or ambiguous directions to officials who are authorized
to make investigations and recommendations.19°
Additionally, the Court found that Aladdin's Castle was free to
refute the findings of the chief of police by presenting evidence
of good character to the Mesquite City Council. The Mesquite
ordinance containing the phrase "connections with criminal el-
ements" was thus neither impermissibly vague nor an impene-
trable block to an applicant's right of procedural due
process.191
The degree of success with which licensing statutes have
withstood the scrutiny of courts in cases like Aladdin's Castle,
Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, Rothner v. Des Plaines, and
188. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980); Alad-
din's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 434 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
189. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and art. I, § 19 of the
Texas Constitution, provide: No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty,
property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due
course of the law of the land. Quoted in 455 U.S. at 292 n.14.
190. Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 290-291.
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City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.'9 2 will probably not
go unnoticed. Communities are likely to use licensing as an
important means of controlling video play by youths and
others in the future.
This could produce positive results for both the community
and for the commercial entrepeneur. Licensing statutes can be
written to meet a community's need to restrict the number of
permit devices in a certain area, 193 to control the ownership of
lucrative commercial establishments dedicated to amuse-
ment,"M and to effectively put owners on notice of the condi-
tions required in return for community commercial
endorsement.' Enterpeneurs will find that because licenses
are issued on an owner by owner basis in a continuing process,
they may be more likely to have an opportunity to be heard if a
license is denied'96 and that the language of the ordinances in-
volved is less likely to calcify in the manner of the earlier anti-
gambling ordinances. 97  Also, because licensing statutes do
not entirely curtail the recreational freedom of a certain group,
perhaps they will not meet the degree of constitutional criti-
cism that has greeted curfews. 98
Licensing statutes which have been carefully tailored to
serve so many ends in the past can hopefully be just as care-
fully, and fairly, constructed and worded as to avoid unneces-
sary constitutional conflicts in the future.
192. For other licensing ordinances which have successfully weathered the courts
see also Malden Amusement Company, Inc. v. City of Malden, No. 82-1840-S, slip op.
(D. Mass. 1983); O'Neil v. Town of Nantucket, 545 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1982); Playtime
Games, Inc. v. City of New York 535 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); America's Best Fam-
ily Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Caswell v.
Licensing Commission for Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 444 N.E.2d 922 (1983); 1001 Plays v.
Mayor of Boston, 387 Mass. 879, 444 N.E.2d 931 (1983); but see Supercade Cherry Hill,
Inc. v. Borough of Eatontown, 428 A.2d 530 (N.J. 1981) and America on Wheels v. Bor-
ough of Eatontown, 428 A.2d 532 (N.J. 1981), where licensing statutes which tried to
completely ban video games from a community were declared invalid.
193. See, e.g., 1001 Plays v. Mayor of Boston, 387 Mass. 864, 444 N.E.2d 931 (1983).
194. See, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982); see supra
notes 185-191 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Town of Nantucket, 545 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1982).
196. See, e.g., America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F.
Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (in which the judge takes note of the mass of litigation that
is about to be heard in New York as individual owners and chains debate the New
York licensing ordinances).
197. See supra notes 73-117 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
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VI
Conclusion
The best means to achieve community regulation of video
games and video arcades seems to lie in the individual licens-
ing of machines to community approved operators. In a
broader sense, however, some form of self-regulation by those
licensed video arcade owners and operators may be the real
key to video regulation in a community.
The Fifth Circuit took lengthy note of the type of well-run,
self-disciplining arcade Aladdin's Castle maintained'99 before
deciding that the constitutional issues were also heavily in its
favor. The self-imposed rules of Aladdin's Castle seem an
ideal way of making sure youths do not get into trouble, or be-
come exposed to the wrong influences or spend an inordinate
amount of free time in pursuit of amusement.
Perhaps, the ideal use of the "police power" in regulating
video games would be in a more frequent inspection of actual
video game operations to be sure that licensed machines are in
use and that owners abide by a reasonable method of self-regu-
lation. Policing by communities "on-the-beat" and in-house
may be the real answer to the orderly, non-truant use of video
games by young people.
199. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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